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AFOSR-452

FEBRUARY 1961

CULTURAL MODELS OF CAPTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS

Albert D. Biderman

BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, II.
Washington, D. C.

BSSR Research Report
339-4

Contract No AF 49(638)727

Behavioral Sciences Division
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington, D. C.

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Bibliography

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A. D. Biderman, Death as a Criterion in the Study of Extreme Captivity Situations, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, February 1961, AFOSR-453, Bureau of Social Science Research Research Report 339-3, ASTIA AD 254487. (Contract AF 49(638)727.)

E R R A T A

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Should Read:</u>
6	14	"survival, e. g., heat, pressure..."
8	insert as line 3	" <u>the exception rather than the rule in high policy regarding prisoners of war has been</u> "
14	13	" <u>fashion</u> "
16	18	"...social organization <u>of</u> prisoners..."
22	7	" <u>unusually high</u> "
23	5	"...numbers of atrocities."
24	28	"as the later phase were <u>at one time</u> "
29	22	"...illustrates <u>the</u> another possible"
30	27	"..., and consequently, <u>survival rates at these ages</u> "
32	6 - 7	"individuals"
34	*	* Source: Biderman, op. cit.
39	21	"folk-knowledge about edible <u>flora</u> , and"
45	13	"natural <u>objective</u> "
45	18	"breaks down..."
52	11	"11. <u>those</u> ..."

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AFCSR-452

FEBRUARY 1961

CULTURAL MODELS OF CAPTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS

Albert D. Biderman

BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, INC.

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ABSTRACT

The behavior of captives is in large measure dependent upon their conceptions of what social roles are appropriate to the unfamiliar situations they encounter. These situations are also shaped in important ways by cultural conceptions of the captor regarding the status of his captives. The present report reviews some of the historical and traditional elements of the cultures of captor and captives that have important direct effects on these role conceptions. Some possible implications of the discussion for the training of armed forces personnel for the event of capture are indicated. The report was prepared as part of a critical review of studies of prisoners of war, concentration camp prisoners, and political prisoners. The study examined the relevance of this literature for the social sciences. The emphasis in the present report, as in the larger study, was on work dealing with the Korean War.

CULTURAL MODELS OF CAPTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction

The present report is one of the preliminary papers prepared as part of a larger study being conducted by the writer in collaboration with Edgar H. Schein to examine the relevance for the social sciences of knowledge developed through the study of stressful captivity situations. For this objective, a critical review was made of the literature on prisoners of war, concentration camp prisoners, and political prisoners. The focus was on studies relating to American personnel captured during the Korean War, but studies of this historical case were considered in relation to broader literature that exists on the subject of captivity.

An outline was prepared for the purpose of analysing and integrating this body of knowledge. It is being used in the preparation of a volume that will discuss the present and potential contributions to the social sciences of this body of knowledge. The organization of the volume in preparation is presented in another report of the present study: (A. D. Biderman and E. H. Schein, The relevance for the social sciences of knowledge derived from studies of stressful captivity, BSSR Research Report 339-2, AFOSR-454, March 1961). It will include extensive reprinted selections from this body of literature with an evaluative and interpretive discussion by the editors.

The first topic approached by the study was the ways in which the behavior of captives is influenced by pre-existing cultural models of captivity relationships. The present report represents preliminary efforts by the writer to examine some of the major historical and

traditional conceptions that have contributed to prevalent definitions of prisoner roles. It is based upon a trial effort toward determining the balance between original discussion and reprinted literature excerpts that would be most useful for treating this particular topic in the volume in preparation. Because this particular topic has been developed in greater detail in the preliminary work than can feasibly be employed in the final volume, this separate report has been prepared. The excerpts from the literature that are contemplated for use in the final work have not been incorporated in this report, with the exception of selections on "The Social Types of War" by Hans Speier and on Chinese Communist prisoner-of-war doctrine. These latter selections were included as illustrative of certain problems involved in the development of the larger work regarding which the writer desired suggestions and because of their relevance to the concluding statement of this report. This statement has been added to indicate a relevance of the report to military problems.

Paranthetical numbered bibliographic references in the present report refer to the bibliography for the entire study, published separately as: A. D. Biderman, Barbara S. Heller and Paula Epstein, A Selected Bibliography on Captivity Behavior, AFOSR-295, BSSR Research Report 339-1, February 1961.

1. Cultural Models and Captivity Roles.

To the extent that there is a central concept in the approach of the present study to the subject of captivity, it is that of the role of the captive. The cultural models of captivity relationships of the societies from which captors and captives derive are basic determinants of captive roles. These definitions have evolved historically and are embodied in the speech, the literature, the law, and the folklore of societies.

2. Legal and Humanitarian Concepts

For understanding the role of the prisoner, it is essential to review the manner in which concepts of the prisoner of war, specifically, and of the captive, generally, have evolved in the culture of modern nations.

A major casualty of modern warfare has been the "Idea of Progress." The sublime faith of recent centuries that mankind was moving steadily toward a more perfect and humane civilization is not dead, but it has been shaken badly by recent events.

It is not long ago that writers on the history of prisoner of war could view the past as a record of the progressive evolution of more enlightened and humane concepts of the status of the war prisoner. Spaight (269), writing at the close of the first World War, commented on the results of the sentence in Article IV of the Geneva Convention on war prisoners, which demanded "They must be humanely treated":

...[It] reminds one of "old, unhappy far-off things and battles long ago." It calls up a picture of the cruelty, torture, slavery, which were the lot of the unfortunate captive in the wars of the good old days. One may almost hear in it the clank of the chain and the swish of the thong. In nothing connected with war has a greater improvement been wrought than

in the treatment of prisoners of war. One need not go back to the time when prisoners were enslaved to appreciate the magnitude of the change. A hundred years ago, England, while she prayed in her national liturgy for "all prisoners and captives", had no compunction about confining the French prisoners of war in noisome hulks and feeding them on weevily biscuit, salt junk and jury rum, which sowed the seed for a plentiful harvest of scurvy, dysentery and typhus. Today the prisoner of war is a spoilt darling; he is treated with a solicitude for his wants and feelings which borders on sentimentalism. He is better treated than the modern criminal, who is infinitely better off, under the modern prison system, than a soldier on a campaign. Under present-day conditions, captivity -- such captivity as that of the Boers in Ceylon and Bermuda and of the Russians in Japan -- is no sad sojourn by the waters of Babylon; it is usually a halcyon time, a pleasant experience to be nursed fondly in the memory, a kind of inexpensive rest-cure after the wearisome turmoil of fighting. The wonder is that any soldiers fight at all; that they do so, instead of giving themselves up as prisoners, is a high tribute to the spirit and the discipline of modern armies.

3. Evolutionary Perspectives

To recapture the scholar's view of prisoner-of-war problems before they were disturbed by the events of the second World War, any of the major encyclopedic articles of the period serve excellently. Trimble (284), writing in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, is representative. The humaneness of prisoner treatment is the central organizing concept of his discussion. He traces a development from Roman times in which the prevalent practice changed successively from extermination to enslavement to ransom to exchange and parole. The final development of what three decades ago he could call the "modern view" is attributed to the influence of Montesquieu and Rousseau. The former's Esprit des lois (Book XV, ch.2), asserted: "War gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further harm by securing their persons."

Rousseau amplified this doctrine in Contrat social (Book I, ch. 4): "War is a relation between state and state in which individuals are enemies only accidentally." They can be killed while they are bearing arms, according to Rousseau, "...but as soon as they lay them down and surrender...they become once more merely men whose life no one has any right to take."

These views became increasingly incorporated and elaborated in legal theory and in agreements between nations, beginning in 1785 with a treaty between the United States and Prussia. Both in this beginning and in the subsequent attempt at codification by Francis Lieber at the direction of President Lincoln, the United States played a prominent role in the development of humanitarian legal doctrine concerning prisoners and internees. A series of international conventions embodied developing versions of these doctrines. These were formulated by conferences at Brussels, 1874, The Hague, 1899 and 1907, Copenhagen, 1917, and Geneva, 1929 and 1949. (98.)

The major principles of these agreements were as follows:

a. the prisoner was defined as in the power of the government which held him, rather than of the individuals who were his immediate captor.

b. the captor government was responsible for the safety, humane treatment, food, quarters, clothing, etc., with the standards of well-being of the captor nation's own troops being the measure of adequacy of provisions.

c. the prisoners were to be insulated ("quarantined" in the words of Prugh, 231) from participation in the war, by guarantees against

their exploitation by the captor for war-related functions, and by the detention of prisoners or their parole under obligation not to reassume arms. The prisoners also were assigned certain duties to the captor, including providing true identification of themselves and their rank (age being added by the 1949 Convention) and to abide by laws and rules for their detention established by the captor power.

Some ambiguity remained in the area of the assumed patriotic duty and motivation of the captive. Two major areas of continuing conflict were recognized. The first was the prisoner's obligation to escape and rejoin his own forces if he could. This right was recognized, and the punishment for re-captured escapees was restricted by these agreements. The agreements also recognized that a similar game would be played in the area of interrogating prisoners for military information. It was regarded as unrealistic to attempt to prohibit the captor from questioning prisoners for intelligence purposes, but all forms of "mental and physical" (320) duress to elicit intelligence information were forbidden.

In recounting the history of actual prisoner practices, the articles and books during the century which saw the development and acceptance of these legal doctrines were largely records of the deviation of practice from these theories. Public attitudes toward the enemy of the moment in almost all wars were not as benign as they were to the symbols of humanity that were considered in formulating these international doctrines. The urgencies, disorganization, shortages, and emotions of warfare made deviations the rule, rather than the exception, even when governments felt that both morality and self-interest urged abiding by the legal doctrines.

With the possible exception of Japanese treatment of Russian prisoners during the Russo-Japanese War, which was long regarded as a demonstration of the practicality of the humanitarian doctrine (269), the international agreements functioned as ideal models that could only remotely be achieved in practice.

4. Sociological Types of War and Prisoner Treatment

Two types of factors account for the extent and nature of the deviations from humanitarian practice that characterized prisoner treatment in recent warfare. One of these is, essentially, the fortunes of war; the relatively unpredictable outcomes of the applications of strategies and resources in conflict that determined how many prisoners were taken by a particular power at a particular time and place. In most of the extreme situations that have occurred, the severities of climate, the lack of logistical preparation and resources, and the disorganization of supplies by highly mobile or destructive combat conditions have had a greater role than the malevolence of the capturing troops or government. More benevolent intents on the part of the latter might have tremendously ameliorated but would not have entirely precluded conditions such as occurred during the U. S. Civil War (130, 132), during the World War II in southeast Asia (308, 331), or at Stalingrad (422).

This matter of intent is a vital factor, however. A possibly broader way of considering it is in terms of how the captor defines the prisoners he captures and the determinants of his conceptions of what activities toward his prisoners are appropriate. While peculiar features of the national culture of the capturing country account for

some of these conceptions, much of them follow from the particular sociological type of war that is taking place. Speier* has presented a typology of social types of war in which he suggests that major varying features of warfare can be distinguished according to the social definition of the enemy.

Rarely has a war accorded with any degree of completeness to one or another of the ideal types of Speier's typology. How close the nature of the social conflict and the objectives were to Speier's models, however, has been an important determinant of the conception of the enemy and the general orientation to prisoner treatment during that war.

The factors considered by Speier seem to have played a more important role in prisoner treatment than the particular codifications of principles that were accepted features of international law at the time. The legal doctrines themselves involved the application of the ideologies of what Speier calls "agonistic" war to a conceptual model of the nature of conflict close to Speier's "instrumental" type.

* H. Speier. "The Social Types of War," American Journal of Sociology, Jan., 1941, 46, 445-454.

The Social Types of War*

by Hans Speier

The three pure types of war may be called absolute war, instrumental war, and agonistic fighting....

Absolute war may be characterized, negatively, by the absence of any restrictions and regulations imposed upon violence, treachery, and frightfulness. In absolute war the enemy is not an obstacle to the attainment of values which he controls. Absolute war is not waged in order to effect a change of the enemy's mode of life; nor is it waged in order to conclude peace with the vanquished foe. Peace terminating an absolute war is established without the enemy. The opponent is an existential enemy. Absolute war is waged in order to annihilate him.

The absolute enemy is not a subject of predatory interest but rather a symbol of strangeness, evil, and danger to the community as a whole. His existence disturbs the order of life in the sense in which order is understood and experienced in the in-group. His customs are scandalous, his rites sacrilegious. His laws are incomprehensible, so that he appears to be lawless. His gods are false idols. Strange dress and manners, unfamiliar weapons, and possibly even his physical appearance symbolize the utter danger to which the in-group is exposed by an attack from the out-group or the provocation to attack which the out-group constitutes. The reproach of perfidy, assault, and atrocious conduct in war are easily incurred under these circumstances, and the answer is given in kind. Owing to the absence of any cultural bonds, of social homogeneity, or of common interests uniting the belligerents, despite their conflict, war is waged without a sense of mutual obligation. Instead, all available means of violence, treachery, and terror are applied without scruples. Absolute war is war without rules, war in which the enemies do not belong to one mankind but represent different kinds of men, as it were, or regard each other indeed as animals. For, in the extreme case, fighting is ferocious not merely because of moral indignation or religious fanaticism but because of the elementary feelings of disgust and horror.

The historical types of war in which restrictions tend to disappear from warfare are, above all, wars against "barbarians," "savages," and "infidels." In the wars of the Greeks against barbarians rules reorganized in intra-Hellenic wars did not apply. Similarly, in the Middle Ages, the use of weapons prohibited in wars among Christians was allowed in fighting the Mohammedans. "The Christian knight is made to forget all honor

* Copyright 1941 by the American Journal of Sociology, reprinted by permission.

and justice in the presence of his pagan enemies. He takes an unfair advantage in battle; he kills the wounded and helpless; he spares only those who, as they surrender, cry, 'Baptism! Baptism!' He needlessly tortures and maims spies. His ideal hero takes no prisoner, he exalts Christianity by pitilessly exterminating all opponents."

Nor is the distinction between absolute and limited war according to the social definition of the enemy a peculiar trait of Western civilization. It exists in many cultures, even among primitive tribes. "Among the Australians unrestricted war is waged only against totally foreign tribes which live far off and of which one hears very seldom. The words used to denote these tribes must be rendered in our language as 'savages' and 'barbarians.'"

The wars in modern times that can be compared to those waged against infidels have been called "ideological" wars. They are fought in the name of political beliefs so dear to the belligerents that they arouse a crusading spirit. When political passion reaches the intensity of religious zeal, the foe becomes an "absolute enemy."

Ideological wars between nations can be called international civil wars when the ideologies are oriented toward class goals....The particular ferocity of civil wars is due partly to the same cause, partly to the intense hate characteristic of civil war.

Apart from war against barbarians and savages, religious, civil, and ideological wars, partisan wars also tend to approach the type of absolute war, especially when inferiority in man power, equipment, and organization are combined with an intense desire for liberation from the military superior conqueror....

Finally, colonial campaigns often assume the character of absolute war because the "savage" is defined as an absolute enemy....

Instrumental war is waged in order to gain access to values which the enemy controls. Thus it is defeat of the enemy—not necessarily his annihilation—which is desired in instrumental war....The extent to which instrumental war approaches the ruthlessness of absolute war depends on the importance attached to the coveted values by the defendant and on the character of these values. Instrumental war will be less ruthless if the victor's control over the coveted values presupposes that the vanquished remain alive. Restrictions of instrumental war are not rooted in respect for God, laws, or one's own honor; they are merely expedient in character....

In the simplest cases violence in war is restricted for expedient reasons because the defeated and captured enemy himself

becomes an immediate source of gain. The victor exploits the labor power of the vanquished by enslaving him or by releasing him for ransom. Evidently the economic organization prevailing among the victors decides whether or not these restrictions will apply. The Iliad contains several passages which make it clear that this economic attitude toward the vanquished foe implies an element of mercy or, to be more cautious, control of rage. It is up to the victor to prefer the economic advantage, consisting in ransom, to the immediate satisfaction of killing the vanquished foe....

Economic foresight may also suggest that the enemies in war be treated during the war itself as future tributaries whose means of production should be spared in order not to diminish the chances of later exploitation.

The extreme opposite of absolute war is the fight waged under conditions of studied equality and under strict observance of rules. Measured in terms of destruction such a fight is highly inefficient and ludicrously ceremonious. However, the agonistic fight, as we know it from ancient Greece and also from other cultures, is not oriented toward the destruction of the enemy, although his death may, of course, ensue. Nor is it directed toward the acquisition of wealth or other useful ends. It is fought for a prize, i. e., for a symbolic value attached to victory (glory).

Each agonistic fight is a contest between opponents who delight in measuring their strength according to certain rules of the "game." The opponents participate in a common culture or respect common cultural values even if they are representatives of different power structures. It is these common bonds which make the contest possible. The regulations reside in respect for values which none of the opponents can be said to control. The values (customs, laws, codes of honor, etc.) transcend the conflict.

The agonistic fight has the qualities of a play, with its freedom, its rules, and its dissociation from useful action. But it is not only, or at least need not be only, a "good" fight—a playful, vital contest. Certain plays are, as symbolic performances, closely related to religious rites. The agonistic fight, too, may be a sacred play—a ritual in which use is made of controlled force in order to determine justice, which ordinarily can not be determined by force. Victory then is a fateful, symbolic revelation of justice, provided that the sacred rules according to which justice has to be sought were meticulously respected. The regulations in agonistic fighting are not rooted in expediency as are the restrictions possibly imposed upon instrumental war. Rather they are the quality of norms.

5. Total War and the Prisoner

Contemporaneous with the growth of international law concerning prisoners was the accentuation of non-rational elements in international conflict. Both nationalistic and political ideologies became more dominant as issues relative to "instrumental" and "agonistic" components. With the present century, wars became more "absolute" or "total" with sharpened "out-group" images of the opponent.

These definitions reached singular intensity during World War II; particularly in the case of German-Soviet and United States-Japan conflict.

The emergent form of war was "total" in an additional sense -- there was a pervasive rationalization of potential means in the service of non-rational nationalistic and political ideologies. The entire physical and social environment of both one's own and the enemy society in rationalized total war becomes open to attempted manipulation or elimination in accordance with the doctrinaire objectives of the ideology (106).

Restrictions of a sacred, sentimental, legal or traditional nature which previously immunized persons, institutions, or physical objects from the war, or made particular practices unthinkable, lost much of their force. These developments were epitomized by the totalitarian state.

The absolute concept of warfare, further, provided the basic operating and organizational principle of these societies even in time of peace -- both Nazi and Soviet doctrine embracing the concept of the nation as at permanent war against hostile elements at home and encircling, hostile powers abroad. A product of this last element of totalitarian

doctrine was the concentration camp"— in conception, much like the extension of the prisoner-of-war concept to the permanent, civil, ideological war. (CF 1, 4)

The distinctive features of recent prisoner-of-war history have reflected both forms of "totalism" that have been discussed; the non-rational and the rationalistic. On the one hand, there has been the accentuation of the image of the foe in total conflict as an individual of another antagonistic world; a non-person meriting extermination, retribution, or at best, reformation. On the other, there has been the rationalistic view of prisoners as an exploitable resource toward the total objective, and the attempt at rational exploitation of prisoners toward all conceivable war objectives; economic, political and military.

While epitomized by totalitarian, particularly Communist, practice, observers see the same influences as affecting prisoner doctrine of the democratic nations. The notion of progress that formerly organized historical accounts of captivity have been largely replaced in the post-World War II world by ones which implicitly or explicitly chronicle an "Advance toward Barbarism" (60f).

Prun (231), a U.S. Army officer and specialist in international law, has expressed alarm at American responses to prisoner-of-war issues in the Korean War. The Communists pressed the war on prisoners; both their own personnel who continued violent political warfare in United Nations prisoner-of-war camps and on captured U. N. personnel whom they attempted to manipulate for a variety of collaborative ends. Prugh regarded

* The term itself, appears to have arisen to describe the mass political imprisonments in Cuba by Spanish administrations during the revolutionary era in Cuba (269).

various official United States responses and counter-measures to these Communist practices as an abandonment of the legal concepts of the war prisoner that had evolved painfully during two centuries. Attempting to control and exploit captured enemy personnel for political objectives and urging continued "resistance by any available means" on one's own troops in the event they are captured, he felt, constitute the abandonment of the legal concept of the "quarantined" prisoner of war for a concept of the "prisoner at war."

Prugh (231) sees in the exploitative measures directed against prisoners of war more a reversion to older practices than marked innovations either by the Communists or western "psychological warriors." Indeed, there are many historical precedents for most of the objectives and techniques of exploitation practiced against prisoners in the Korean War by either side, and the somewhat more sophisticated measures which were used in the course of psychological warfare activities in World War II (43, 98, 99, 141, 173, 214, 229, 274, 282, 303). Recruiting and impressment of captives, by both coercion and persuasion, is almost as old as warfare. Particularly in revolutionary wars, and in many other ideological wars, it has been common for lower-ranking prisoners to be regarded as "liberated" from the power of their oppressors; at least those among the prisoners who were willing to enunciate the slogans of their captors. The use of prisoners as propaganda spokesman and producers of propaganda output is also an ancient practice. A campaign of defection, recruitment, and propaganda exploitation among Hessian soldiers was a major operation of our own Revolutionary War, enlisting the attention and energies of the Commander-in-Chief and various other leading figures of the revolutionary government.* Interrogation, and the broad range

* L. H. Butterfield, Psychological Warfare in 1776, in W. E. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, A psychological warfare casebook, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, March 1958.

of ancillary tactics for eliciting cooperation in interrogation, similarly involve few recent innovations (43). The use of prisoners in labor directed toward war-ends, and their frequent use for exceptionally hazardous tasks, have also been the rule in history (329).

While no single one of the objectives or methods of prisoner exploitation that were encountered during the Korean War can be regarded as a completely novel departure, taken as a whole, a qualitative difference becomes apparent. This involved the application of the concept of totalitarian control to prisoners -- the concept that all activities and energies of all persons subject to the control of the Communist state should be organized systematically and enthusiastically so as to be in harmony with the ideological goals of Communism.

There have been numerous comparisons made between Nazi concentration camps and Communist prisoner-of-war and slave labor-camps (e.g., 1, 4). Nazi-run camps, even apart from the extermination camps, were characterized more by terror than the typical Communist example, in that there was a much greater pervasiveness of the extremes of sanctions -- assuming death and severe physical violence to be the extremes. Communist-run camps have been regarded as more totalitarian in that the sanctions -- while generally less pervasive and extreme -- were directed toward more intensive and extensive control of the lives of the prisoners. In comparison with the Communist case, the Nazi concentration camp was indeed, in the words of Burney (394), a "dungeon democracy." Terror in the Nazi case was also far more promiscuous. To a considerable extent, the allocation of terror was controlled by inmates. Although the extreme terror in fact set the basis for the captor securing prisoner compliance with the most ego-alien demands -- including participation in the murder of thousands of his fellow

prisoners -- its instrumental functions seem to have been subordinate to its ultimate, intrinsic, expressive character.

In contrast, terroristic sanctions in the ideal model of a Communist camp function in support of a detailed prescription of the behavior of prisoners. The prescription tends to eliminate any areas of prisoner initiative and autonomy. All prisoner acts, including the most minute, are made to appear to serve a grand ideological purpose. The Chinese Communist system approached this characterization particularly closely.

The Nazi and Communist models can also be contrasted by the overt malevolence toward prisoners of the former and the maintenance of an air of benevolence by the latter.

6. Other National Variations in Prisoner Concepts

There have been different degrees of identification with the various traditional concepts of the prisoner of war in different nations. To a considerable extent, the legal, humanitarian, and chivalric traditions are products of Western European traditions. Even among countries of the West, however, different emphases have been placed upon different elements of the prisoner tradition.

In Germany, for example, the strong military tradition permitted survivals of chivalric, military attitudes toward prisoners of war to coexist through the Nazi period with the Nazi concentration camp pattern. This was particularly true with respect to the treatment of officer prisoners of the Anglo-Saxon nations (331).

In all countries, there has been some modelling of organization for administering prisoners of war on penal institutions, particularly military detention barracks. The prison camp is enough like a jail at

any time to make for a carry-over from attitudes toward the familiar civil institutions to the status of the war prisoner. In the United States, the security element has traditionally been the dominant one, at least initially, in defining the problem presented by war prisoners to the captor. Control over prisoners has been assigned to the Provost Marshal General of the Army (335). Exploitation of prisoners for labor, intelligence, or propaganda has usually been accorded secondary priority. Agencies interested in exploiting prisoner resources, in each successive war in which the United States has engaged, have been handicapped by unreal, over-concern with custodial problems (173, 282, 329).

Russia, on the other hand, has had a long tradition of masses of captive laborers; particularly their use in areas of arduous climate. War prisoners of the Soviets became integrated into this system of forced labor (4). Their statuses have frequently been indistinguishable -- neither better nor worse -- from those of Russian citizens caught up in the same system. War prisoners, political prisoners, and criminal prisoners have been intermixed in the same camps and work details. The multi-national and multi-racial character of the Russian empire has also contributed to the weaker distinctions between the war prisoner and other prisoners of the Russian state. (377, 386, 450, 470, 510, 627, 628)

7. The Prisoner as an Alien

In most situations, a more fundamental determinant of the status of the prisoners of war than the fact of his captivity is his being a foreigner among a strange people. The more alien he is, the more likely it is that his relationships with his captor and captive will be affected. Differences in American treatment of Japanese prisoners from that accorded Italian and German prisoners in World War II constitute one illustration.

The events involving American prisoners in the Korean War, and reactions to these events (46), owe perhaps as much of their quality to the attitudes toward members of the other race on the part of captor and captive as to this being an encounter with Communist forms of prisoner control. They are in this way similar to the specially emotional atmosphere which was noted by Wolf and Ripley(302) as complicating the adaptation of Americans to Japanese captivity.

Thus, the expectations of Americans who were captured involved anxieties about oriental barbarism, probably as much as about Communist barbarism. World War II depictions of Japanese atrocities provided a fresh basis for these anxieties. It is also likely that the reversal of historical status relationships between Oriental and Caucasian in the case of American prisoners of the Koreans and Chinese motivated some of the attempts at humiliating prisoners which occurred, accentuated the humiliation which prisoners experienced, and contributed to the American public's reaction to these events (45). Special complexities in these emotional relationships were doubtless introduced by the recent, and only partially assimilated ethic, which denied the validity of invidious racial distinctions, while being too weak to prevent subjective reactions on this basis.

Prisoners in Korea and China, as well as interpreters of their experiences, have had difficulty in discriminating between those strange-seeming practices that were features of a traditional, alien culture, and those that were features of an unfamiliar ideology. Thus, American flyers imprisoned in China were compelled to wear shackles and to walk with the bowed heads and humble gaits traditionally expected of prisoners.

in that country; but the intensity with which these restrictions were applied to them was varied with the degree of their submission to political demands of their captors (188).

Moyers and Bradbury (212) trace much of the difficulty of adjustment and sources of animosity of Chinese prisoners held by the United Nations to their failure to understand the impersonal bureaucratic and juridical norms with which they were handled. Their customary mode of adjustment, according to these writers, was to make a personal "deal" and to gain personal "merit" with whoever was in control of their situation. For American prisoners of the Chinese, the obverse constituted a source of difficulty in interrogation. Their interrogators expected them to act in such a way as to "gain merit" in the interrogators' eyes, while the prisoners expected more uniform application of impersonal standards of compliance with the captor's rules. Both Chinese and American prisoners consequently found the treatment unpredictable and capricious.

8. The Military Concept

With some approach to universality, prison camps are run on military models with military or quasi-military personnel staffs. This is the case with camps for civilian internees and political and penal prisoners. In Nazi concentration camps, even the dead frequently had to stand formation for a few days while waiting to be stricken from the rolls.

After the Korean War, there was the widespread feeling that a collapse occurred of military organization and military identities among American prisoners of war. This was reflected in the major official action following the war -- the enunciation of the "Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States". Its primary orientation

was a re-emphasis of the principle that a prisoner of war remains a member of the armed forces and should act in accordance with that identity (146).

The preceding paragraphs indicate a frequent source of role strain for the prisoner of war, in that he is considered to be simultaneously a member of two antagonistic, military organizations -- that of the captor and that of his own country. The international agreements on prisoners of war are in considerable measure addressed to resolving this incongruity. Following the military model, they largely concentrate the problem in a channel in which there is theoretically but one point of contact between prisoners and captor -- the relationships between the senior prisoner officer (or enlisted representative) and the camp commandant. These two officers, as bound by the principles of the convention on their rights and duties vis-a-vis each other, are charged with resolving such conflicts as may arise (98).

In practice, relationships of captive personnel with captors are rarely confined to those which proceed through this channel or to those that are within the span of control of these two seniors. Further, both members of the legal point of contact between prisoner and captor organization frequently have motivations toward their own side that override any obligation they recognize to the principles of the international codes governing their relationships. The same is equally as more true of lower-ranking participants in the situation of both sides who are less conversant with and responsive to the legal doctrines (151).

9. Military Concepts and Prisoner-of-War Resistance

Contrasting with the view that death and collaboration among American prisoners in Korea could be traced to a collapse of military organization and identities, are other views which have regarded the

the traditional military model as inappropriate to many of the situations that confront captives. The domination of prisoners by military concepts, according to some of these views, has precluded them from conceiving of other modes of organization and action that would be more appropriate to the situation. A popular work of fiction, The Bridge on the River Kwai, conceived of a pathology of the military role in the case of a senior officer. Less fictional are the frequent instances, including occurrences in Korea, where junior officers have felt it necessary to undermine the authority of the senior officer whom they felt had succumbed to the pressure and surveillance of the captor and had become overly-collaborative with him. Covert organizations led by low-ranking individuals who are least subject to pressure and surveillance have been mentioned as necessary for effective resistance to an exploitative captor. The difficulty of maintaining traditional forms of military organization uncontrolled by the captor in the face of deliberate measures of the latter to disrupt such organization, as in the Korean case, has also been pointed out (100,296).

There has also been some conjecture that there may not be congruence between the personality or social type who makes the best officer or soldier and the one who makes the best motivated, artful and effective resister to an oppressive captor. Such contrasts as obedience versus rebelliousness, or trustworthiness and candor versus deceitfulness come to mind.

There is a similar divergence at the level of models for group organization and behavior. As contrasted with the problems with which military organizations conventionally cope, the most directly applicable forms of resistance to an oppressive captor are found in the traditional lore of criminal and political prisoners; revolutionary, nationalist and

and underground movements; militant, radical labor unions; oppressed national minorities. Strikes, slow-downs, demonstrations, sabotage, hunger strikes, terrorism, covert propaganda and provocation, are among the traditional acts in the repertoire of such groupings.

Military organizations are familiar with these tactics as targets and repressors of them, rather than as organizers. The members of the American military establishment tend to be unfamiliar with these tactics in either way, relative to military men of most other nations. The United States is characterized by relatively high consensus toward its institutions, tolerance of deviation, and relatively pacific modes of adjusting differences between authority and mass. Only in a few areas of national life are there encounters which present some counterparts to the demands of group resistance and harassment in POW camps -- labor strife, underworld activity, and the prison system, for example. Men with experience in challenging and harassing authority in these roles are not well represented in the armed forces, however.

There is one kind of relevant experience that is common to most American males, however. This is the frequent defiance, evasion and harassment of school authorities by students. It is consistent with this observation that the two best organized and most successful examples of group resistance activities recounted by Americans repatriated from North Korean captivity suggest that such youthful experiences may have served as their guides.

The well-publicized "Crazy Week" demonstration in one of the camps during the height of the Communist indoctrination program was one such instance. The prisoners suddenly began to act as if they had gone mad -- some walking around the compound fondling and kissing imaginary

female companions; others riding about on imaginary bicycles, motorcycles, or horses; one clipping his hair into an Indian warlock, doing a war dance around the compound, and claiming protection as a member of an oppressed minority. The tactic appears to have more of the earmarks of a college prank than of military-minded resistance to a ruthless captor.

A second type of successful resistance was the sabotaging of the efforts of the Chinese to hold compulsory group indoctrination sessions. The prisoners here had many ways familiar to them for disrupting these meetings which resembled so closely the classroom situations with which they were all familiar. They would prop some other reading matter up behind the indoctrination material they were supposed to be studying; shuffle feet and otherwise create an unstudious din; feign misunderstanding of the 'instructors' remarks; ask heckling questions and ones leading the instructor toward discursive answers; hound the "teacher's pet," etc. Very similar tactics were developed independently by various groups of prisoners for meeting this type of situation. Whether because of sabotage or for some other reason, the captor abandoned entirely this mode of attempted indoctrination of his American prisoners.

That such "non-military" behavior as was involved in these acts of resistance is regarded with favor by military commanders indicates that the fundamental expectation for "military conduct" is a demand for action in accordance with norms of patriotic heroism that will be discussed below.

10. Pre-Capture Concepts of Captivity

Few who become war prisoners have much concrete knowledge of the elaborate doctrine relating to captives that has been discussed. This is unlike the case with the criminal offender, particularly the

professional criminal. There is a highly developed lore in the underworld regarding prisons and prisoners, with which many if not most offenders who enter prisons have had contact. Further, there is great continuity extending back for at least two centuries in the culture of the penitentiary, and the underworld culture of which it is a part.*

As has already been mentioned, this leads to the application of the better known model of the penitentiary to the prisoner-of-war situation by both captives and captors, for want of a coherent concept for structuring the unfamiliar situation. Traditional prison slang has frequently come to be used by prisoners of war; even among unlikely groups like the highly gentlemanly Union officers imprisoned during the Civil War at Belle Island in Richmond. In his memoir of Belle Island, a cultivated Italian nobleman who was imprisoned there, for example, refers to new prisoners as "fresh fish" (400).

This lack of cultural continuity, and the limited acquaintance new prisoners have with the elaborate culture that does exist concerning the war prisoner, are sources of basic problems of prisoner-of-war existence: the demands for behaving in an incompletely defined situation. In most situations of ordinary life, familiar, well-rehearsed roles exist for the individual which guide him to appropriate and effective conduct in the situation. Much of the strain of captivity situations that individuals experience derives from the lack of such patterns and from the labor, anxieties and errors involved in the improvisations to meet this lack.

* E.H. Sutherland (ed.), The professional thief; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, H. Wentworth & S. B. Flexner, Dictionary of American Slang. New York: Crowell, 1960.

The demands on the prisoner in this respect are aggravated by the fact that captor personnel who are the immediate authorities in the situation are handicapped similarly -- they too frequently possess no experience and no adequate cultural models for guiding their behavior vis-a-vis captives. We have also commented earlier on the problems associated with the prisoner usually being in a strange, foreign environment.

These problems are likely to be less severe in prisoner-of-war systems like that of the Soviet Union in World War II which were characterized by greater continuity both with the past and with other institutions of incarceration of the country. Except where great masses of prisoners were taken and had little contact with older groups, there was a developed, pre-existing culture and social system into which prisoners could integrate themselves.

11. Attitudes to Captives

Newly-captured prisoners are not completely devoid of concepts regarding captivity in general, or their particular captivity status, however. Song and story in all cultures, if not the more formal media of information and entertainment, expose even the most unsophisticated persons to some of the lore concerning captives. The basic image developed by these general cultural productions is that of the suffering and heroism of the captive at the hands of an oppressive, inhumane enemy.

Rarely has captivity been regarded as pleasant, although troops in many wars have indeed found being a prisoner of war an almost idyllic contrast with what their situation had been in battle (269). It has rarely been necessary, however, for governments to have to manufacture

cases in order to produce those stories of atrocities against prisoners by their enemies required for the propaganda that would dissuade potential deserters. Rare indeed is the war in which a considerable number of atrocities did not occur and the treatment of war prisoners has been generally bad, rather than the reverse. The will to believe the worst about the enemy and the zeal of propagandists have nonetheless almost always led to intensifications, exaggerations, and fabrications in atrocity propaganda (132). There has always been a note of terror associated with captivity.

In the post-World War I period, there was a reaction against war propaganda in general and against atrocity propaganda in particular. A propaganda-consciousness arose permeating most strata of western countries that made people inclined to discount tales of atrocities.* Consequently, the organized barbarity on an unprecedented scale that characterized the Nazi concentration camps only slowly registered on public consciousness. Indeed, a realization of public distrust of atrocity propaganda led the Allied nations in World War II to adopt a deliberate policy of underplaying Nazi atrocities in order to insure credibility for their output. Allied propagandists recognized:

"Because people now expect war to be horrible, it is not so easy to shock their sensibilities. An incident must be more intense than ever to qualify as an effective 'atrocity'. On the other hand, in the face of widespread consciousness and of resistance to propaganda, and a heightened skepticism of atrocity propaganda in particular, the task of establishing belief is much harder. Many of the requirements of credibility, furthermore, conflict with those of intensity, creating an added dilemma." (147, p. 239).

* E. Kris and N. Leites, Trends in 20th Century propaganda in G. Roheim (ed), Psychoanalysis and the social sciences I, New York: Int'l. Univer. Pr., 1949.

As a consequence, only in the post-war world did the events of the Nazi era penetrate public consciousness and then only dimly.

Nonetheless, the Nazi concentration camps have left a lasting association of captivity with unspeakable horrors that has shaped the cultural concepts of captivity of the present day. In wartime Germany, there was also an overlapping of the prisoner-of-war and the concentration camp systems, particularly as it affected the fates of French, Russian and Polish prisoners of war.

For Western publics in the post-war World, Communism became defined as an even more inhumane and dangerous foe than Nazism had been. Although there were distinctive aspects to anti-Communist atrocity reports and to reactions among westerners to Communism as an enemy, there was a generalized identification of the horrors totalitarian regimes inflicted on captives.

While these developments of public attitudes involved a hardening of public response to reports of atrocities against others, the effect on those who became captives was different. Expectations involved to a greater extent the fear of being subjected to unspeakable horrors -- the terrorization toward which at least some atrocities have been directed. The repression that characterized typical responses to news of atrocities further has been suspected of intensifying the anxiety element in these anticipations. At the same time, the characteristic skepticism of atrocity propaganda left the new captive with some element of hope that his fears were the result of his having been tricked by his own propagandists into thinking the worst of an enemy who was actually much more benign than he had been portrayed. Horror was expected as characteristic of the enemy the prisoner had been fighting and hating, but there was also the unsettling

hope that the enemy would prove to be human, if not a friend. The prisoner's hope for his future involved in this way a denial of his immediate past.

12. The Heroic Concept

In mass media and folklore, second only in prominence to depictions of the barbarity of captors toward prisoners, is the theme of the heroism of the prisoner. With surprising frequency, the ordinary man feels under some obligation to play the hero's part in extreme captivity situations, but much rarer are opportunities for playing the heroic role with any degree of visible success. Controls imposed by the captor, and the limited control the prisoners can exert over their environments, restrict greatly the scope of possible actions according to heroic models.

Nonetheless, former prisoners writing on their own behavior and the behavior of others feel that vindictiveness is necessary where their behavior was other than a model of heroism. Writings by non-participants also implicitly include normative expectations that persons in extreme situations will accept far greater risks and greater self-denial than in ordinary life situations. This is particularly true with respect to attitudes toward military prisoners (214). The analogy is sometimes drawn to the risks of combat to which soldiers are expected to expose themselves willingly, if not with equanimity. The implicit expectation regarding captivity, however, differs in that it presumes to a greater extent the person exposing himself as an individual to exceptional risks, apart from those he experiences as a member of his group.

13. The Escape Tradition

The most highly developed aspect of the heroic model of captivity behavior is the escape story. Escape is reported to be the most precious

of captive dreams. In recent wars, including the Korean, it has been the primary objective for which prisoners of war organized secretly among themselves. While the escape tradition possibly is not as highly developed in the United States as in England, where it rivals detective and spy stories as a category of popular literature, it is nonetheless a prominent theme in American heroic lore.

In many British escapers' tales from World Wars I and II, the treatment of captivity is as a setting for the game of escape. It is written about as a sport. There have been captor personnel who have approached the prisoner-of-war situation with a somewhat similar sporting conception. Their role in the game was conceived as something like that of a goal keeper -- a much duller position than that of the escaper's, but still an exciting one to be played according to the rules and with mutual respect among the antagonists (see, e.g., 568, 569).

These attitudes are characteristic of agonistic conceptions of war that were discussed earlier. There have been extensions of the idea of the "escapers club" to more total conflicts where captors had less sporting notions of their role and that of the prisoner, however. In part, this stems from there having been considerable continuity through successive wars in the escape tradition, especially among professional military personnel, with successful escapees from one war being prisoners in the next and passing along much of the lore to their younger fellows.

The escape tradition has been emphasized particularly among Air Forces -- partly because of its close relationship to the contingency of evading capture and escaping from enemy territory after crash or bail-out behind enemy lines.

The escape tradition, and the many stories of successful World War II escapes, provided the setting for some to regard the record of American prisoners of war in Korea as shameful in that it was reported that none had escaped "from an organized POW camp" (556).

Military forces foster escape activities among their members who become prisoners of an enemy for reasons beyond the obvious significance of the number of men who may effect a safe return to their own lines. Even when unsuccessful, it is frequently pointed out, escape attempts function to divert the attention and resources of the enemy from other war pursuits. More fundamentally, escape activity is regarded as the keystone upon which organization, discipline, and morale of prisoners have frequently been built. This has been the case even in situations where escape was feasible at best for only a tiny fraction of the men confined (125, 346).

This view of escape activities is similar in some respects to the concept of the "heroic myth" of Sorel*, which he analysed with particular reference to the role he advocated for the general strike in a socialist revolution. While regarding the general strike itself as unrealizable, he saw in it a heroic objective with capabilities of evoking fervent shared images and an intense solidarity. He also saw it as constituting a basis for discipline and training that was directly tied to the immediate problems, grievances and natural groupings among the classes that would compose the ranks of a revolution.

Escape has functioned as the "heroic myth" among many groups of prisoners.

* G. Sorel, Reflections on violence, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950.

14. Resistance to Interrogation

A second well-developed theme of the heroic prisoner tradition is resistance to the captor's efforts to wrest information from the captive. To the extent the Armed Forces have given recognition to a need for preparing troops for the event of capture, it has been in the area of indoctrinating personnel to divulge no information to an enemy beyond the minimum demanded by international law -- name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. This was the only aspect of captivity regarding which any significant number of Americans captured during the Korean War had any official instruction.

The present writer (4), p. 120) has stated elsewhere:

Few injunctions are as intensely and universally accepted as that which demands that a soldier should give no aid to an enemy with whom his nation is at war. For the prisoner of war, the most explicit expression of this general norm has been the rigid order to divulge nothing to his captor beyond that minimum international law requires him to give -- the celebrated "name, rank, serial number, only." Adherence to this rule has been held forth as the most specific test of virtue which the prisoner encounters -- proving his loyalty, patriotism, morality, courage, manliness, etc., are all made to depend upon "not talking."

The same set of cultural doctrines which embodies the norm of nonintercourse with the enemy views torture and pain of death as the only excuse for deviations from it. So central and basic to the identity of the prisoner are the values demanding that he resist the enemy that only forces which cause him "to lose control of himself" can be conceived as explaining "collaboration with the enemy" by a person of "sound character."

The same paper discusses the stereotyped and sensational quality of prevalent images of prisoner interrogation -- conceptions of physical and mental tortures that the captor employs to "break" the prisoner.

15. Other Heroic Models

Beyond escape and interrogation resistance, there appears to be little specific content in popular images of the heroic role appropriate to the prisoner.

Another fairly frequent theme in writings by survivors of the more extreme situation, however, is the heroic portrayal of the feat of survival itself; and survival with the maintenance of the integrity of one's personality.

Comment has already been made on the more recent conception of the obligation of the prisoner "to resist by every means available" -- the extension of the battle to the prisoner camp (225, 231). Various accounts have glorified acts of harassment and sabotage against captors, and vigilante activity against fellow prisoners who deviate from the patriotic, political or social code of the dominant prisoner group. In Korea, anti-captor acts extended from petty, school-boy-like anti-authoritarian acts, such as taunting guards or chalking patriotic slogans, to the murder of captor personnel. A similar range has characterized acts within the prisoner community (501, 513, 531, 620).

16. Chinese Communist Prisoner-of-War Doctrine

The prevalent image of Communist treatment of Americans in Korea as developed by news reporting in the United States is a composite of the "atrocities" theme and the "brainwashing" theme -- brutality and naked coercion, on the one hand, and sly, mysterious mind-manipulation on the other (26). Most accounts have also concluded that the Chinese were extremely successful in achieving their exploitative objectives in applying their methods to American prisoners.

The high success attributed to the Chinese Communist exploitation of American prisoners has been ascribed by various sources to the unfamiliarity and surprise of Americans at the novel tactics employed by the Chinese against them (247, 260, 261, 346).

To a considerable extent however, the features of Chinese prisoner treatment that occasioned the greatest surprise when encountered by Americans in Korea were those that could have been anticipated on the basis of knowledge of earlier Chinese Communist prisoner practices and doctrine; while those which were more in accordance with Americans' expectations represented deviations from established Chinese Communist doctrine.

The distinctive characteristics of Chinese Communist military doctrine, including that relation to POW, stem from the fashioning of the thinking of the Red leaders during the long civil war. Crucial to the Communist victory in that war was the absorption of enemy elements into the "People's Liberation Army," along with their material (572). One of the "Ten Military Principles" of the CHICOM is: "Replenish ourselves by the capture of all of the enemy's arms and most of his personnel. The source of the men and material of our army is mainly at the front."*

The development of these doctrines during the war with the Japanese from 1937 to 1945 was reported in a World War II Office of War Information

*Mao Tse Tung, "The Present situation and our tasks." Report to the Seventh National Party Congress, 25 December 1944.

intelligence report in 1945 that was recently reprinted:

Chinese Communist Prisoner-of-War Practices in World War II*

The first leaflets and pamphlets used in the psychological warfare against the Japanese were radical in tone, with such exhortations as "Overthrow the Emperor", "Down with the militarists", and "Carry out the revolution in Japan." The only result of such literature, as reported by prisoners, was to antagonize the Japanese troops.

In November 1938 at the Communist Party Central Committee session, Mao Tse Tung pointed out that the war was equally hard on the common people of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. He urged a "united front" of all these people against the war of aggression, and a resolution to work for such a united front was passed. The troops and the peasants were indoctrinated with this concept and the Anti-enemy Work Section began to use it in its psychological warfare.

The desired reaction among the Japanese troops was still not forthcoming, however, so the Anti-enemy Work Section began to work with Japanese prisoners to learn why their methods were unsuccessful and to try to work out better ones.

It found that prisoners responded amazingly to friendly sympathetic treatment and learned that the principal reason for the failure of all its techniques was the universal fear among Japanese troops of the treatment they would receive if captured by the Chinese.

The Anti-enemy Work Section soon decided that its first task was to overcome Japanese fear of mistreatment at the hands of the Chinese. The first thing it did was to formulate the "Battle Discipline" for its own troops on the treatment of prisoners. The following order was issued to Chinese soldiers:

"Japanese soldiers are the sons and brothers of the toiling masses. Deceived and coerced by the Japanese warlords and financial oligarchs, they have been forced to fight against us. Therefore:

1. Any injury or insult to Japanese captives is strictly forbidden. No confiscation of or damage to their belongings is permitted. Officers and men of our army who disobey this order shall be punished.

2. Special and proper care shall be given to Japanese captives who are wounded or sick.

* Selections from Propaganda activities of a Chinese Communist Army in World War II, in W. E. Daugherty and M. Janowitz (eds.), A Psychological warfare casebook, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, March 1958, ORO-T-360, 844-860.

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3. If Japanese captives wish to return to their own country or return to their original troop units, all possible convenience shall be given them to reach their destination safely.

4. Those Japanese captives who may wish to remain in China and work for the Chinese Army shall be given proper work. Those wishing to study shall be helped to enter suitable schools.

5. Facilities shall be given to captives who wish to correspond with their families or friends.

6. Japanese soldiers killed in battle shall be buried and suitable tombstones erected.

Signed: Commander in Chief-Chu Teh
Vice Commander in Chief -
Peng Teh Hua!

This order was actively carried out by the Chinese 19th Group Army troops who also passed it on to the peasants in their area. Li Ch'u-li explains the reason behind the order: "Through softening their hostile feelings toward us we build a bridge for our propaganda to reach them." They have also found that their only really effective psychological warfare workers are prisoners who have learned from experience that the "Battle Discipline" is a reality.

In 1939 Japanese prisoner-of-war volunteers formed the "Awakening League," which soon became the Japanese Pac. 's Anti-war League, as a branch of the same organization founded in Chungking by Kaji Wataru. In August 1942, the North China Branches of the league met in conference at Yen-an. Various prisoners of war reported to the conference on their own experiences in various Japanese army units and the effect of Chinese propaganda on Japanese troops. They reported on specific grievances and discontents among the Japanese soldiers.

As a result of the August 1942 conference, 228 specific "demands," such as the demand for more food, for protection against mistreatment by officers, were formulated and incorporated into a pamphlet called "Demands of the Soldiers."

The Anti-enemy Work Section decided to direct its efforts toward stirring up discontent among the Japanese troops. The best evidence that such tactics are successful and that the "Demands of the Soldiers" has proved a powerful weapon is furnished by captured documents. These prescribe severe punishment for anyone in the Japanese army caught reading or in possession of the pamphlet.

Until the conference of prisoners of war and the members of the Japanese Antiwar League, psychological warfare work was carried out by the Political Affairs Department of the Chinese 18th Group Army, with gradually more and more participation by the Japanese workers. After 1942 the Japanese workers began to take over this phase of the Political Affairs Department's work until now (1945) it is practically all done by Japanese. The Japanese Workers and Peasants School, established at Yen-an in November 1940, and similar training places, educate Japanese prisoners of war to carry on this psychological warfare work....

The Japanese Workers and Peasants School in Yen-an has set up a Propaganda Committee of 18 "students." They work out programs and write some leaflets. These are radioed to Japanese People's Emancipation League units in the field. Most of the leaflets are prepared by the field units in accordance with the headquarters' directives.

The Anti-enemy Works Section sends telegrams twice a week to its field bureaus giving summaries of Japan's military and economic position and of conditions in the Japanese North China army. They also include suggestions as to the propaganda use of the news. Part of the telegrams relate the experience -- the success or failure -- of the various psychological warfare units....

The good treatment of prisoners of war has become the backbone of Chinese 18th Group Army's psychological warfare. The aim, after all, of all psychological warfare is essentially to take prisoners, or to so influence the enemy that he will lose his will to fight, with capture or desertion the usual result. But soldiers must first be reasonably certain that capture will not mean a fate worse than death, and the general policy of the enemy toward prisoners is soon known to the soldiers.

Captured Japanese, as soon as they are disarmed, are treated like friends by the 18th Group Army. That the peasants who have suffered so much from the sadistic treatment of Japanese troops always treat captured Japanese well is to be doubted. There is irrefutable evidence, however, that in many places, captives have been well cared for, and this, under all the circumstances, seems remarkable.

Prisoners are given first-aid treatment, if it is needed, on capture, and then sent to the rear for preliminary education. Workers of the Anti-enemy Work Section supervise this education, with the assistance of

Japanese league units. The latter do all of the work here they are adequately staffed.

A pamphlet in Japanese is prepared to give to each captured Japanese soldier as soon as he is taken. This explains the nature of the 18th Group Army and its war aims, as well as its conception of the true nature of the war and the way it has affected Japan and China.

At first the aim is merely to assure prisoners of good treatment and to overcome their antagonism. Little attempt is made to do more than answer their questions and explain as much of the 18th Group Army attitude and ideology as they seem interested in learning. There are no concentration camps and no compulsory labor for prisoners of the Chinese 18th Group Army. Prisoners enjoy almost complete liberty. They are segregated along officer-soldier and recalcitrant-cooperative lines, but the same treatment is given all groups.

After a couple of weeks of good treatment, the prisoners who want to go back to their units are released. The more hostile the prisoner, the sooner he is released. The 18th Group Army workers believe that this is logical action — if the hostility of a Japanese cannot be overcome he will be even better proof to his fellows that prisoners are not mistreated by the Chinese. Each prisoner released is given a little farewell party (often joined in by the peasants) and generally small gift. This is the policy of the Anti-enemy Work Section to send back Japanese soldiers who do not want to return, though it is admitted that this probably is done by some guerrilla bands ill-equipped to care for prisoners. For security reasons, no prisoner is released after he has been in Yenan or, probably, in any other permanent headquarters.

The prisoners who respond to the kind treatment and show an interest in the ideology or concepts of the 18th Group Army or the Japanese People's Emancipation League are further instructed and indoctrinated and are used as soon as possible in psychological warfare units. Some prisoners after their several months' education are used to instruct 18th Group Army men in the use of Japanese weapons. One Japanese engineer is working as an engineer in an 18th Group Army brigade; one Japanese doctor is head of one of the 18th Group Army hospitals.

At first the 18th Group Army was afraid to return prisoners for fear they would only have to fight them again. They also feared the prisoners would be killed by their own officers. Even when they did allow them

to return it was only after a long period of indoctrination and when the prisoners proved receptive to instruction.

Now the 18th Group Army leaders advocate releasing most prisoners who express a desire to go back to their own lines, and within a very short time after capture. They explain that, so far as having to oppose them again is concerned, there are too few to make much difference. Also, no matter what their officers do to returned prisoners, they cannot hide the fact the 18th Group Army has permitted their return and that they have not been mistreated while in Chinese hands. The Chinese do not expect that returned prisoners will form resistance cells in the Japanese army or even cease to be their bitter foes. But one thing their very presence will incontrovertibly prove -- 18th Group Army soldiers do not mistreat prisoners. In this way they also prove that this much, at least, of Chinese propaganda is true.

The significance of prisoner-of-war exploitation to the Chinese Communists at the time of their entry into the Korean War can be appreciated by noting the extent to which they attributed their success in both the war against the Japanese and in "China's Liberation War" to their prisoner-of-war policies. This theme was elaborated for English-speaking readers in People's China immediately after the beginning of the Korean War by a member of the Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council:

THE PLA POLICY FOR WAR PRISONERS *

In the course of the four years of China's Liberation War, from July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1950, the People's Liberation Army wiped out a total of over 8,070,000 Kuomintang troops, of which 5,220,000 were taken prisoner or surrendered. Another 1,140,000 laid down their American-supplied arms and crossed over to our side.

*Reprinted excerpts from Chiu Kang, The PLA policy for war prisoners, People's China, Aug., 1950, 2 (3), 8-9.

During the Liaoyang-Mukden campaign in the winter of 1948, more than 370,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers were annihilated, of which 320,000 were captured or surrendered. Of the 500,000 KMT troops in the Peiping-Tientsin Area, almost half were taken prisoner while most of the remainder, led by General Fu Tso-yi, accepted our surrender terms. After the PLA's great victory in the Hsui-hai campaign near Hsuehchow, the great majority of Chiang's remaining crack forces (nearly 600,000) joined the already numerically superior PLA, bringing an abundance of American equipment with them. The revolutionary army's subsequent sweep through South, Southwest and Northwest China was accompanied by many similar episodes.

These spectacular successes in winning the enemy to our side can be largely attributed to two factors: to the PLA's policy of treating its war prisoners with leniency and consideration, and to its effective policy for undermining enemy morale.

...Soon after the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek, at the instigation of the American imperialists, unleashed his full-scale attack against the Liberated Areas. Though numerically inferior, the PLA was able to inflict a series of heavy losses on the enemy right from the outset. The KMT troops quickly began to lose their will to fight. They dreaded entering the Liberated Areas as if they were going to their graves. Under such circumstances, our policy of magnanimity towards war prisoners offered a way out for Chiang's reluctant troops. This was one of the many reasons for the mass surrender of KMT forces that soon became a characteristic of all large battles.

It should be noted that our political work was invariably synchronized with military operations. Never for a moment did we entertain the illusion that we could overcome the enemy by political work alone. Experience had taught us that the greater our military strength, the more effective our political work became. Similarly, the more effective our political work, the swifter and larger were our military successes.

It should also be noted that our policy of leniency did not apply to all of our foes alike. Our policy of discriminating between officers and men in our treatment of prisoners was announced in 1947. According to a manifesto issued by the PLA on Oct. 10, severe punishment would be meted out to the people's No. 1 enemy, Chiang Kai-shek. His top accomplices were also declared

national war criminals. However, we announced that those who had committed crimes against the people would be given a last chance to lighten or commute their eventual sentences by severing their relations with the reactionary regime and rendering meritorious service to the revolutionary cause. Those who worked openly or secretly for us would be appropriately rewarded. KMT officers who came over to our side would be offered the same choice as their men to remain with the people's army or return to their homes.

Treatment of War Prisoners

How do we treat our prisoners of war? Our fundamental policy is to win them over, re-educate them, and gradually remould their ideology and behaviour so as to transform them into new persons who may be of service to the people.

When a group of new prisoners is taken, we first allay their fears by our considerate treatment. They are neither searched nor forced to give up their personal belongings. Those with injuries receive medical care alongside our own men.

The officers are quickly separated from the enlisted men. Although officers frequently try to conceal themselves as ordinary soldiers, their own men invariably point them out to us sooner or later. The junior officers are also segregated from their superiors and receive different forms of political re-education, since they respond to re-education more readily than the generals. During the latter part of the war, junior officers were sent back to the KMT areas after two to three months of training if they wished to leave then. While these officers, who come largely from the upper classes, could not become revolutionaries in such a brief time, this period was sufficient to make them politically neutral. Such persons were no longer willing to risk their lives for a lost cause, and they usually surrendered promptly at their next contact with our forces.

We have never had prisoner-of-war camps for ordinary soldiers. At most, if their numbers are great, they are sent to a rear area assembly centre. After a few lectures on the nature of China's revolution, followed by small-group discussions, they are encouraged to hold Accusation Meetings at which they relate their past sufferings under the KMT rule, both in the army and before conscription. After several of such Accusation Meetings, about four-fifths of these soldiers will demand to be taken into the PLA so that they can help

overthrow the reactionary forces that have oppressed them all their lives.

This brief period is also enough to show the prisoners how entirely different a people's army is from a reactionary army. They are first impressed by the democratic unity existing between our commanders and fighters, who live like members of one large family, sharing the same food and living conditions. They are also impressed by the harmonious relations between the army and the civilians, an astonishing thing for KMT soldiers who have previously received only curses from the peasantry whom they robbed and oppressed.

These are some of the reasons why such tremendous numbers of KMT soldiers joined the PLA so enthusiastically. This is also why cowardly fighters turned so rapidly into brave warriors. Many of them even made so much political progress that they have been accepted into the Chinese Communist Party or the Democratic Youth League. Quite a few attained the rank of junior officers. Many others sacrificed their lives for the revolutionary cause.

These liberated soldiers, as these captives are customarily called, constituted a steady supply of reinforcements for our PLA ranks. And, I should like to emphasize, we have found no difference between the revolutionary potentialities of such liberated soldiers and of the volunteers who joined our army in the Liberated Areas.

Why is this so? The war we are fighting is a righteous struggle against armed reaction. The rank and file of the enemy's army have been recruited largely from the exploited classes. They have nothing to fight for but the chains that already weigh heavily on their necks. Once inside the KMT army, the maltreatment they receive teaches them new depths of misery. Under such circumstances, it is very easy for them to come over to the people's side and many even turn their guns against their commanders on the battlefield.

Our policy towards prisoners is an inherent part of a revolutionary people's army, one of the many features which distinguishes a peasants' and workers' army from the armies of the exploiting classes. The correctness of this policy has been confirmed by more than twenty years of combat experience. Without such a policy, the PLA could not have so swiftly achieved its great revolutionary victories of today.

17. The "Lenient Policy" as USAF POWs Encountered It

It need hardly be said that the actual experiences of American POWs in Chinese camps in Korea were considerably at variance with the idyll which a literal interpretation of the "Lenient Policy" as depicted would lead one to expect. Yet, rather than react with surprise to those many instances in Korea which accorded with a literal application of the "Lenient Policy," it seems more profitable to determine here how and why the actual treatment of prisoners of war in Korea deviated from it.

Americans captured by Chinese troops generally encountered the "Lenient Policy" from the moment of capture. In almost all instances, troop elements who captured Americans (or who received them from North Korean civilians or military police) behaved as if they had been thoroughly indoctrinated with the "Lenient Policy." More frequently than not, these elements interpreted the policy quite literally. While generally the captive was discomfited by being the object of much staring and curiosity he usually was not otherwise subjected to indignities or mistreatment by capturing troops (although many were later victims of atrocities). The captors were generally polite, if not friendly. Almost invariably, the prisoner was allowed to keep most of his personal equipment. When items of equipment were taken from him, his "permission" would frequently be asked and receipts given for items confiscated.

Many encountered the words of the "Lenient Policy", as well as these kinds of deeds, at the moment of capture. Capturing troops would assure the prisoner that he would not be harmed; that he would be sent to a camp where prisoners just played games, read, and studied; that he would probably be released to his own forces after a short time; all of this it was explained, was part of the "Lenient Policy" toward prisoners of war of their leader, Comrade Mao.

Continuously through his captivity, the prisoner heard the words of the "Lenient Policy" again and again. Most prisoners found considerable discrepancy between the words and the actions, however. A corollary to Schein (253):

"Shortly after capture the men were marched north in groups of varying sizes and were confined in temporary camps for a period of weeks or months. During this period the men experienced extreme privation and physical hardships: food was scarce and unfamiliar, medical care or consideration for the sick and wounded was almost nonexistent and clothing and shelter were inadequate against the severe winter weather. The POWs were told, however, that they were getting exactly the same treatment as the average Chinese foot soldier, and supply shortages were always blamed on UN air activity.

These great physical hardships served to make the prospect of any improvement in conditions a powerful inducement. We cannot judge whether the Chinese deliberately manipulated hardship in order to increase collaboration, but it is clear what this was its effect. The POWs experienced many disappointments in this early period, expecting an improvement in conditions and seldom finding it. Instead they often discovered a deterioration of conditions. Not until the men reached the permanent camp was there a more adequate supply of food, medical care, clothing and shelter.

Another factor which led some men to seek solution in collaborating or at least predisposed them to listening to communist indoctrination attempts was the overriding fear of nonrepatriation that plagued most of them. The Chinese linked early repatriation with the cooperativeness of the POW, and late repatriation or nonrepatriation with excessive recalcitrance on the part

of the POW. The creation of this kind of atmosphere and the eliciting of collaboration were aided by the fact that threats and promises were always linked to strong feelings present in the men. In particular, the intellectual appeal to peace was linked to an already existing discontent with fighting for an unclear cause on foreign soil."

18. The "Lenient Policy" and the "War Criminal"

Many of the Americans, particularly officers and Air Force personnel of all ranks, encountered a version of the "Lenient Policy" in which it was not automatically applied to them. This version was encountered by practically all of those accused of "participation in bacteriological warfare." It was "explained" that the captive "was not really a POW, but actually a war criminal." He was considered a "war criminal" because of his "participation in bacteriological warfare," his "violation of the frontiers of the People's Republic," his "espionage activity," or simply because "he had engaged in imperialistic war against the Korean people."

"Can, by sincerely repenting your crimes," these POW were told, "can you gain the forgiveness of the people and be treated as a POW entitled to the benefits of the "Lenient Policy."

Evidence of "repentance" entitling the "war criminal" to POW status could mean any number of things in terms of concrete acts. In the minds of the Communist interrogators or, as some were called, "instructors," this meant not only various acts of collaboration but also the uniquely Chinese Communist concept of "mind reform." The POW was told that he would have to show that he had "the correct attitude." Thus, an act, such as completing a "confession" for those accused of "bacteriological warfare," was demanded as a demonstration that they had "sincerely repented." The "confession," to be acceptable, had to contain

expressions of remorse, "self-criticism," and usually castigation of the "warmongers." But, as most of the "confessors" learned, this compliance itself was not sufficient to demonstrate the "correctness of their attitude." Their hopes that they would be released from isolation and sent to a POW camp now that they had done their captor's bidding generally proved unfounded. Demands for demonstrations of their repentance and for a more thorough "reforming of their thoughts" were apt to continue (33).

There were frequent instances, during the course of hostilities, of prisoners who were told that they had been "forgiven for their crimes" and would be sent to regular POW camps, apparently without any specific manifestation of "repentance" on their part. In the cases of those accused of "bacteriological warfare" participation (both those who "confessed" and those who refused), the "war criminal" and "Lenient Policy" fictions were carried through to the time immediately preceding their repatriation. At this time, elaborate formal "trials" were conducted at which the accused were "forgiven for their crimes" and granted repatriation in accordance with the "Lenient Policy."

As well they might have been, almost all POW were thoroughly perplexed by this triad of Chinese Communist terms: "Lenient Policy," "War Criminal," and "Correct Attitude" (or "Thought Reform"). The latter two emphases in Chinese practice also represented something of a departure from the accounts of their policy as reportedly carried out in previous conflicts. While both "indoctrination" and "war criminal" charges had flourished before, there were both quantitative and qualitative differences in their application to Korean War prisoners.

part of the reason for the POW being thoroughly confused by the inconsistencies between the "Lenient Policy" and these two other elements appears due to the probability that their captors were also confused; i.e., that an adjustment was only gradually being worked out between older and more recent elements of Chinese Communist politico-military doctrine.

The "Lenient Policy," as frequently enunciated by Chinese Communist leaders, had become a necessary first step in Chinese Communist military doctrine long before the beginning of the Korean War. Other developments in doctrine, and the specific characteristics and opportunities of the Korean War itself, however, made for modifications of its application. First of all, the "war criminal" concept became a major tool of Communist propaganda throughout the Communist world during the later stages of World War II. An indication of its dominance in later Chinese affairs is the fact that in the post-World War II period, "Punish the war criminals" was made the first of Mao Tse-Tung's demands for conducting peace negotiations with the Nanking government.* It was the legal fiction being used by the Russians (although apparently not by the Chinese) for holding hundreds of thousands of Axis prisoners who were useful as forced laborers or technical specialists long after the agreed date for their repatriation. The "war criminal" charge was a particularly useful device to use against the United States and its allies because of the Allied participation in setting "war crimes" legal precedents at the close of World War II.

In Red China, the "war criminal" concept had to be applied after the Civil War in accordance with realistic demands of consolidating the

* Mao Tse-Tung, "Statement of the Current Situation," KCHNA dispatch, January 14, 1949.

nation. The stated policy in this regard was: "On this question, we must observe the policy of combining suppression with leniency, that is, the policy of punishing the principal culprits but not those forced to become accomplices, and of rewarding those who have later rendered meritorious service."* In the Korean War USAF personnel were caught in "adjustments" of the "Lenient Policy" to accord with the exploitation of "war criminal" propaganda.

The experiences of Korean War POW also differed from those of Japanese and Chinese Civil War prisoners because of another aspect of the Communists' modes of consolidating their victory in the Civil War. This was the extension of the application of "thought reform," which originally had relevance only to the Party and the Red Army, to the population as a whole.** Many of the bewildering demands for "reforming your thoughts" and "adopting the correct attitude" which POW encountered were merely an application to them of demands that the Chinese Communists placed on everyone under their control -- the population of China. For the "most reactionary," the pressure for "thought reform" was all the more intensive.

The American prisoners, particularly Air Force personnel and officers in segregated situations, encountered a considerably more coercive and punitive atmosphere than that described in reports of Chinese Communist treatment of their Civil War and Japanese War prisoners.

* Mao Tse-Tung, "Report to the Third Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," June 6, 1950.

**For a discussion of the nature, development and extension of the "thought-reform" or "study" movement, see T. C. Yu, The Strategy and Tactics of Chinese Communist Propaganda, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Human Resources Research Institute, (Studies in Chinese Communism, Series II, No. 3), Ch. III.

Other deviations of practice during the Korean War were also marked.* Thus, prisoner-of-war camps on more or less orthodox lines were eventually established by the Chinese, counter to their doctrine of not interning POWs in special, barbed-wire enclosures.** This may have been due partially to the fact that rear base areas for Chinese operations in Korea were located in China and the Chinese wished to avoid the involvement of Chinese territory in mass removals of prisoners to these areas. Another reason, and perhaps the major one, appears to have been the greater recalcitrance and lower assimilativeness of Americans, as contrasted with Chinese and Japanese prisoners who had figured in the formative experience of the Chinese in prisoner handling. During the earliest period of Chinese involvement in the war, the great fluidity of the battle situation presented logistical and security demands which made literal application of the traditional "Lenient Policy" to Americans infeasible.

At the beginning of their involvement in the war, the Chinese Communists attempted their hitherto usual procedure of intensive indoctrination, followed by the release at the front of POWs. Only about 300 of the American prisoners experienced an indoctrination camp closely approximating the model described in the descriptions of earlier Chinese Communist practices, however. This group -- 250 Army personnel and 45 U.S. Marines -- were held at a camp called by the prisoners "Peaceful Valley" because of its contrast with their earlier captivity experiences.

*The following discussion is based on unpublished papers of ARDC Task 77313.

**Apparently uncomfortable about confining prisoners in barbed wire enclosures, the Chinese occasionally told the Americans that the fences were there to protect them from elements who might be hostile.

and in apparent mockery of the peace slogans of the Chinese. At "Peaceful Valley" during its 10 month existence, the mortality was less than 10 per cent, as contrasted with rates of 40 per cent and more which characterized the other major camps in Korea during the same period. In May 1951, 19 Americans from this camp were loaded down with propaganda materials and released at the front. The practice of returning prisoners to their own lines after intensive indoctrination was abandoned after this "Peaceful Valley" incident. Compulsory indoctrination sessions for United Nations prisoners were eventually abandoned altogether at other camps although such sessions were continued on a "voluntary" basis.

There was no attempt at incorporation of Americans into Chinese (or North Korean) forces. Also, the types of collaborative activity to which American prisoners were put did not depend nearly as much upon responsibility and initiative of the prisoner as did those tasks for which Chinese and Japanese prisoners had been utilized.

Although some prisoners were told at the time of capture that they would have the opportunity to become members of the "People's Army," this "opportunity" was never seriously suggested in an official way, insofar as is known. Indeed, the major issue which stalled the conclusion of an armistice for such a long period was the Chinese insistence on the principle of universal repatriation of prisoners -- a principle directly counter to their previous prisoner doctrine (607). Much of the shift of emphasis in Chinese treatment and doctrine regarding prisoners they held was a response on their part to the problems presented them by the defection of members of their own forces who were held by the United Nations.

Communist doctrine of war has many residues of the revolutionary era of Communism. The closer in time to the revolutionary epoch, the greater has been the carry-over of the social revolutionary thinking in the military policies pursued. This appears true of prisoner-of-war doctrine as well as other matters. In recent engagements with Western forces, the prisoner practices of Vietnam (447) and Malayan (234) guerrillas appears to have involved the closest approximation to a complete subordination of other requirements and concepts to those given by the revolutionary ideology. Chinese Communist practices during the Korean War were much more radical than those followed by the Russians in World War II, but considerably less "radical" than was true of Chinese Communist prisoner-of-war policy during the Civil War in China and in the Sino-Japanese War.

19. Some Possible Implications for Military Training

The major complaint of American prisoners captured during the Korean War can be summarized as: "We were not told what to expect." The most frequent type of recommendation they have given for preparing military personnel for the event of capture is that soldiers be given some knowledge of what life in captivity may be like (41, 43, 343, 346).

In the present paper, just a few of the general and specific cultural traditions have been sketched which may contribute to shaping the pre-capture images of how the man who becomes a captive will be treated and of how he should act. The discussion here may give some indication of the many elements of the content of prisoner roles that can stem from these varied historical and cultural sources and of the incongruence of many of these elements.

The possibilities for organized action of prisoners and captor personnel are only broadly defined and circumscribed by these cultural sources, as rich and complex as they may be. Further elaboration of these roles takes place through the interaction of the participants in the situation itself.

The many cultural and situational sources of role definitions of the captive subject him inevitably to various forms of what might be termed "role pathology," including ambiguity and conflict in his own definitions of his role and in the interrelations of his own conceptions with those of fellow prisoners and the captor. These role difficulties constitute a source of stress for the captive which is frequently commensurate with the stresses of his privational environment. The frequency with which former prisoners rate "not knowing what to expect" as a major difficulty they experienced in coping with captivity is interpreted as reflecting such role stresses.

Training in "what to expect" that former prisoners recommend could only begin to sketch the myriad of role possibilities and contingencies set by the many relevant aspects of the cultures of captives and captors. Such training, however, can probably broaden greatly the range of possibilities for action of those who may become prisoners by increasing the ways in which they can conceive of themselves in their situation. Pre-Korean War documents on Chinese Communist prisoner-of-war practices indicates, furthermore, that bases existed for predicting those aspects of their treatment of POWs that departed most from prevalent preconceptions. Had this knowledge been incorporated in training, it would have eliminated much of the "shock of the unexpected"

for those who were taken prisoner.

For military training, for the event of capture, the relationship of military roles to other role demands confronting the war prisoner requires consideration. Action by prisoners of war in accordance with ultimate norms of patriotic, heroic loyalty may involve role conceptions not congruent with conventional military ones.

Given the infeasibility of detailed prediction and specification of viable roles for the individual in the event of capture in some future conflict, it is believed that effective general training and indoctrination for such an event would be difficult to devise. Such training and indoctrination as is given should recognize the need that will generally be experienced for acting and improvising

- in situations of high ambiguity and conflict.

Historically, the fates of prisoners have depended to a significant extent on their individual and group efforts to cope with privation and resist exploitation. Their fates have in far greater measure been dependent upon the constraint of captor tendencies toward rationalistic exploitation and non-rational malevolence by cultural doctrines regarding the status of the prisoner. Training and indoctrination to be realistic must be cognizant of the attenuation of these constraints in recent years. The perils of captivity will be increased, however, if these measures contribute toward further attenuation of the traditional, legal and humanitarian doctrines that are accepted as the "normal" bases for defining the role of the captive. In particular, it would appear important to protect the principle that manipulative political exploitation of prisoners, as well as their neglect and

mistreatment, is unprincipled. Persons subject to capture should be prepared to expect each of these kinds of treatment, alone or in combination. "Expected" in the predictive sense should not be allowed to become confused with "expected" in the normative sense, however. Outrage should continue to be defined as the appropriate reaction to illegal exploitation, neglect or mistreatment.

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